Category: The JDA

On Friday I did a post for Jr Deputy Accountant on Accounting “Irregularities” on the Rise in the Recession after I saw a piece in Reuters about battered financial statements:

Corporate balance sheets may be showing signs of the wear and tear from the prolonged U.S. recession as accounting irregularities are starting to surface at growing numbers of U.S. companies.

Going Concern also covered this so it’s been decided by the blogosphere that this one deserves your attention.

Friend of both yours truly and Going Concern, Financial Armageddon’s Michael Panzner caught this tale and tied it in to one he’d done the day before on banking shenanigans.

In yesterday’s post, “Bad C’s,” I highlighted a few reports that lent further weight to the notion that the financial sector has not been a paragon of virtue, to put it mildly. Yet while many banks and brokers have engaged in some pretty bad behavior — which, among other things, helped bring about the worst financial crisis this century –they are apparently not the exceptions to the rule, as jr deputy accountant reveals in “Accounting ‘Irregularities’ on the Rise in the Recession”:
Reuters is reporting accounting fudging and fraud are on the rise in the US as a result of “pressures” for companies to perform despite the hostile economic environment.

The previous post he refers to sums it up nicely:

In an interesting twist of fate, the firms that have traditionally decided who should get credit have been put in the position of needing extraordinary amounts of other people’s money just to stay alive. Unfortunately, based on what we’ve seen so far, including reports like those that follow, it’s doubtful whether most, if not all, of today’s troubled financial institutions would even qualify for a loan based on traditional measures of suitability — like “character,” for example — if their friends in high places weren’t so intimately involved in the process.

Going Concern agrees in “Homebuyer Credit to Continue Helping People Get into Crazy Debt?“
Worse, large banks (or rather Regions Financial) are willing to lend to bankrupt municipalities and bank regulators will not step in and say “Hey, WTF are you doing?” (yes, I’m talking to you, Atlanta Fed). This is your bank and it’s quite obvious even to the common man what they are doing – you don’t loan money to someone who has no money and has not paid their sewer bill in 16 months. Red flag!
It’s ugly out there and it doesn’t appear to be getting any prettier any time soon.
Oh and Economic Populist has some additional ideas on the subject. You’re welcome.

Editor’s Note: Want more JDA? You can see all of her posts for GC here, her blog here and stalk her on Twitter.
There’s a new regulator in town and if his recent comments are to be taken seriously, he’s not kidding around.
The Fed gets plenty of face time these days as the regulatory face of the financial crisis, leaving the SEC, PCAOB and auditors limping behind. Unlike federal regulators, the Fed has a unique muscle due to its dual role as central bank and supervisor and Fed governor Daniel Tarullo would like you know that he is not afraid to flex it.
That’s great, but Tarullo might be getting a tad ahead of himself. I believe one former Fed official called him an “egotist”.

In recent months, Tarullo has been fairly quiet since he was installed at the Board of Governors in January of this year but he seems intent on speaking out lately, positioning himself as an early hero of commercial real estate and a regulatory force to be reckoned with. He even kicked off his week with a thorough Wall Street Journal rub:

The rise of Daniel Tarullo, a lawyer with a longstanding interest in bank regulation appointed to the Federal Reserve Board by President Barack Obama, is a sign the era of light-touch bank regulation is over.
New guidelines on bankers’ pay proposed by the Fed last week reflect Mr. Tarullo’s influence. He is shaking up the Fed’s 2,858-person army of bank supervisors, weighing in on issues ranging from the way regulators deal with troubled commercial real estate loans to the rules that will govern global banking for years to come.

Oh please, how ominous.
Regulatory rewrites might not be the first thing on his to-do list as newbie Fed governor, Tarullo’s first big takedown may be the Atlanta Fed.
As Tarullo came in, Atlanta Fed’s head of banking supervision went out, with the Board in Washington dispatching a few Board goons to keep an eye on Atlanta’s supervision department until they find a new sucker to head things up over there. With 20 Georgia bank failures for 2009 (out of 106), you can see why Daddy in DC might be worried about what Atlanta is (or isn’t) doing.
Tarullo appears to be positioning himself as a bad ass regulator ready for war and I wouldn’t take that threat lightly if I were Atlanta Fed, especially since they already know what it feels like to be on his shit list.

Editor’s Note: Want more JDA? You can see all of her posts for GC here, her blog here and stalk her on Twitter.

I have often been accused of taking the term “audit” in “Audit the Fed” a tad too literally. Thinking as an auditor might stem from spending far too many hours in Audit class (I’m not a CPA, I just play one on teevee). Nevertheless, I cannot help but wonder what proponents of a Fed audit think they’ll find once they crack open the books.

My primary concern is that Fed accountants do not use GAAP but rather a bizarre hybrid of GAAP, governmental, and WTF accounting. In fact, they write their own 325 page manual on accounting for Federal Reserve Banks and if you’re really really bored you can find that document here. What auditor is qualified to audit those statements? In no other situation would the client hand you their accounting manual and say, “Do us a favor and make sure we prepared our statements in accordance with our own special rules, would you? Thanks!” except in this case. And maybe that’s where I’m hung up on the word “audit.”

Some have argued that the “audit” in “Audit the Fed” actually means “crack open the books and figure out where the bailout bodies are buried.” Okay, that’s all well and good but even if that’s the case, how would an independent, outside source identify these bodies? It goes back to the client-provided handbook and we’re back at square one: defining the Fed balance sheet as a freak of nature.

It’s right there in the footnotes – pulling out the closest Fed annual report I’ve got (Richmond Fed 2007), both Deloitte and PwC agree that the Fed is a special case in Note 3: Significant Accounting Policies:

Accounting principles for entities with unique powers and responsibilities of the nation’s central bank have not been formulated by accounting standard-setting bodies.

The note goes on to explain why government securities held by the Fed are presented at amortized cost instead of GAAP’s fair value presentation because “amortized cost more appropriately reflects the Bank’s securities holdings given the System’s unique responsibility to conduct monetary policy.” Right there, you can see why auditing this thing might be a problem.

Proponents of HR 1207 and now newer proposed legislation to storm the Fed’s financials say that we need transparency from our central bank but I have argued time and time again that we’ll never get there poking around their statements trying to find the bloody glove. We’re
going to have to do better than an audit. Hell, Citigroup can pass an audit.

For more on Fed audits from yours truly, check out Fed Economic Rocket Scientists on Auditing the Fed, Liquidity Crises, They’re Comin for Dat Ass, Bernanke: Defining “Federal Reserve Accountability”, Auditing the Fed: Redux, and You Want to Audit the Fed. But Why?

Editor’s Note: Want more JDA? You can see all of her posts for GC here, her blog here and stalk her on Twitter.
The IRS is going after off-shore tax shelters and international banks to get its cut (presumably to make up for some tax revenue it has been missing out on in the last, oh, 8 years or so) but according to WebCPA, the IRS might want to tighten up its game on refunds.
It isn’t that the IRS is cutting checks for the heck of it – it turns out that the Treasury Department may need a quick refresher on controls for payments.

WebCPA:

[The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration report] found problems in the IRS’s handling of taxpayer payments that are subsequently dishonored by the banks in which they are deposited. Dishonored payments are not processed by banks for a variety of reasons, the report noted, including insufficient taxpayer funds. The IRS occasionally issues a refund to a taxpayer who had submitted an overpayment of taxes before the IRS realizes that the taxpayer’s check has been dishonored by the bank. This results in the taxpayer receiving an erroneous refund.
Between Jan. 1, 2008, and July 17, 2008, the IRS generated refunds as a result of dishonored check overpayments totaling approximately $53 million. TIGTA estimates that the IRS was unable to stop more than $20 million in refunds from being erroneously issued to nearly 14,000 individuals.

Well wait a minute, it was going to issue $53 million but was able to figure out $33 million were cut in error. That’s not so bad, is it?
The IRS cop out is that tricky stimulus check business of 2008 in which several dishonest taxpayers stopped payment on tax checks and made off with the stimulus booty instead of the money going towards offsetting the taxpayer’s tax liability. Sneaky!
Seriously, in the age of electronic funds transfers and billion dollar money market runs that cripple the financial system in a matter of minutes, how is it the IRS is still so far behind the times?
The TIGTA report claims that resolving this issue with proper controls on the IRS’ end could “protect approximately $102 million over the next five years from being issued to taxpayers in error.”
What’s $102 million nowadays anyway? That’s not even a fraction of an AIG bailout. No wonder the IRS isn’t trying too hard.

Editor’s Note: Want more JDA? You can see all of her posts for GC here, her blog here and stalk her on Twitter.
Don’t Mess With Taxes had an interesting piece over the weekend on populist rage – you know, angry mobs with pitchforks ready to come after the first Goldman rat who even whispers the word bonus – and some interesting numbers to chew on, specifically when it comes to taxing the rich:

The top income tax rate of 35 percent is the lowest it’s been since 1992. For a good chunk of the 20th century, the wealthiest U.S. taxpayers handed over much more (90-plus percent from 1950 to 1963) to Uncle Sam.
Capital gains rates also are at historic lows. And richer folks tend to take advantage of capital gains (and losses) more often than the general populace since wealthier individuals usually are more active investors.

DMWT’s column was inspired by an NYT piece entitled All This Anger Against the Rich May Be Unhealthy in which the rich bemoan their tricky fate:

For the wealthy, their public image is a secondary concern since so many of them seek to live anonymously.
“They feel mischaracterized,” Mr. LaMothe said. “They know the time and effort they contribute. They fund scholarships and all the things they do routinely, and then to be characterized as not doing their fair share begins to wear on them.”
From the outside, the wealthy seem to be one big money-minting group. But how they came upon their wealth differs greatly. And those who did not make their fortunes in finance seem just as angry as everyone else about what Wall Street has wrought.

NYT’s got a good point. Outrage against Wall Street is one thing but what’s this blanket sentiment of anger towards rich people in general?
A recent Bain and Co. report projects a 8% drop in luxury good purchases (or about $227 billion) for 2009 with a “full” recovery in the luxury sector by 2011. Were it not for “populist outrage” against the wealthy, perhaps we’d see slightly more growth in this area moving forward but the wealthy have – wisely – trimmed down conspicuous purchases, presumably to keep the angry mob off their backs.
Worse, once Geithner and Co. wise up and realize how low tax revenues from the wealthy have been in recent years, it will be like a brand new financial vein to tap with or without much-needed tax reform.
Looks like a pretty convenient time to be broke, eh?

Editor’s Note: Want more JDA? You can see all of her posts for GC here, her blog here and stalk her on Twitter.
It’s official, I’m sick of hearing “experts” weigh in on fair value. After my anti-PCAOB rant earlier this week, I thought I’d heard all there was in terms of the fair value argument.
Leave it to Goldman Sachs’s fearless leader to pull this little rabbit out of his hat and shock the shit out of me. In a Financial Times op-ed earlier this week, Blankfein doesn’t directly toot Goldman’s horn, though anyone who knows the lotion in a sock trick might recognize this as a blatant jerk-off.

For a man whose institution lurks in the cesspools, erm, dark pools, Blankfein is awfully incredulous as he criticizes both regulators and institutions for slacking on their valuations. GS calculates the fair value of their positions daily? Christ, no wonder they’re making buckets of cash.
FT:

It is not enough even that all exposures be identified. An institution’s assets must also be valued at their fair market value – the price at which willing buyers and sellers transact – not at the (frequently irrelevant) historic value. Some argue that fair value accounting exacerbated the credit crisis. I see it differently. If institutions had been required to recognise [British sic] their exposures promptly and value them appropriately, they would have been likely to curtail the worst risks. Instead, positions were not monitored, so changes in value were often ignored until losses grew to a point when solvency became an issue.
At Goldman Sachs, we calculate the fair value of our positions every day, because we would not know how to assess or manage risk if market prices were not reflected on our books. This approach provides an essential early warning system that is critical for risk managers and regulators.

FT’s own John Gapper even gets in on the Goldman fapfapfap, defending their practices as not exactly illegal, just really, really clever.

Its run of success since its 1999 initial public offering has not been based on “pump and dump” broking but on sticking obstinately to the institutional, less-regulated elite end of the market.
One rival Wall Street executive describes Goldman (with rueful admiration) as “a bunch of clever thugs”. He means that Goldman has been tough about seizing profitable opportunities even if that involves, for example, bidding for an asset against a former client.
Whatever Goldman is doing to make money, it works.

Crack dealers and prostitutes also make a lot of money but that doesn’t make it right. Just sayin.

Editor’s Note: Want more JDA? You can see all of her posts for GC here, her blog here and stalk her on Twitter.
You know that annoying roommate you had in college who always stuck his finger in your peanut butter jar? That’s the PCAOB meddling in fair value and it won’t be pretty.
On October 14 – 15th, the PCAOB’s Standing Advisory Group (SAG) is slated to meet to discuss the particulars of fair value and starts off by admitting that “The Board has no authority to prescribe the form or content of a public company’s financial statements.” OK, so WTF are they doing then?

Via CFO.com:

For the past couple of years, regulators have nudged auditors to get more skeptical when it comes to evaluating fair-value measurements. In the meantime, the controversial accounting rules governing how companies apply fair value have been tweaked and companies’ use of judgment for assigning fair-value price estimates to their financial instruments has grown.
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is dipping into contentious waters again by suggesting that new fair-value auditing rules are necessary. The board’s staff has long contended that the use of estimates based on market value — rather than historical cost — adds uncertainty and subjectivity to financial reporting and an added risk of material misstatements. At the same time, the regulator has been slow-footed on previous attempts to change its rules when it comes to auditing fair-value calculations.

So what gives, PCAOB? Don’t you trust that auditors are trained to do their damn jobs?
Apparently not. The PCAOB is concerned that auditors lack the technical skill to evaluate complex financial instruments and frankly I could see why they might be a tad concerned.

Regardless of the applicable accounting requirements, it is a fundamental requirement that the auditor obtain sufficient competent audit evidence to provide reasonable assurance that fair value measurements and disclosures are in conformity with the applicable accounting principles.
The staff believes that a standards-setting project to revise its existing standards on auditing fair value measurements and using the work of a specialist may be appropriate for a number of reasons. Information obtained from the Board’s inspection and enforcement programs indicate that some auditors might not be exercising sufficient professional skepticism when performing audit procedures and evaluating results in higher risk areas of the audit.

Well that’s fabulous. Isn’t it already in an auditor’s job description to approach an audit with professional skepticism and to obtain sufficient audit evidence? So, uh, is the PCAOB implying that auditors have no idea what they are doing? Why doesn’t the PCAOB just do all the audits?
It’s a brave new world, kids, and the PCAOB knows it. Perhaps if regulators had done their job in the first place, auditors wouldn’t be facing increased pressure to somehow decode increasingly complex securitization, off balance sheet entities, and absolutely bizarre financial instruments. But since that’s our reality these days, might as well pop a few Xanax and start ticking and tying your way through those billions in derivatives. Quick, the PCAOB is coming!

Telecom company Comverse hasn’t filed financial statements in 4 years and the SEC has just now gotten around to settling with them. Does that make sense to anyone?
Continued, after the jump

Three years after getting caught in a huge stock-options backdating scandal, technology company Comverse appears to be nearing the end of its crisis. The company recently reported that it had come to an agreement with the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, consenting to a permanent injunction over any future violations by the company of American securities laws.
Comverse will also have to meet its periodic reporting requirement to the SEC no later than Feb. 8, 2010.
The agreement acknowledges that Comverse neither admits nor denies the allegations that the SEC filed against the company, and no fines will be imposed. The settlement is subject to court approval.
Comverse President and CEO Andre Dahan called the settlement an important step forward. “With these matters resolved, we remain focused on our plan to be relisted and on carrying out our strategies for the long-term success of Comverse Technologies,” he said.

(source)
That’s all well and good but no fines? That sounds like encouraging bad behavior to me. What the SEC is saying, in effect, is that companies don’t really need to file financial statements, and if they do they can backdate all they want and perhaps the SEC will come around eventually to slap them on the wrist. Sounds like effective regulating to me.
Comverse subsidiary Ulticom finally filed 2005 – 2008 financial statements with the SEC this month and the company promises it will resume issuing quarterlies to the SEC in 2010. Well shit, why?

During the probe of the effects of the options backdating affair, following which Comverse CEO Kobi Alexander fled Israel to Namibia, Ulticom discovered additional accounting irregularities in the company’s financial statement preparations. Mistakes had been made in the recognition of postponed revenues in the years 1998-2004, and the expenses on intangible assets during 1999-2004 had been incorrectly assessed.
The correction of these irregularities resulted in a $6.8 million write-off from revenues prior to 2005, after which the company filed complete statements.

(source)
What’s the lesson here, kids? Do whatever the hell you want, it’s not like the SEC is going to stop you. It’s the IRS you’ve got to be afraid of, not the children over at SEC Elementary.
Also see: Where’s the Sex Tape, Comverse?