Tag: KPMG

Can a KPMG Audit Intern Pull the Switch to Advisory?

Welcome to the tax-day-tease edition of Accounting Career Emergencies. In today’s edition, a young Brit has an audit internship with KPMG but would wants to pull The Switch and work in the advisory practice. Proposing a ménage à trois probably isn’t going to work so what’s the alternative?

Are you tired of being tired? Trying to build a celebrity client practice? Need some gift idea for your new overlords? Email us at advice@goingconcern.com and can recommend something other than a fondue set.

Back across the pond:

Dear GoingConcern Team,

Firstly I have really enjoyed reading your articles and as a budding/ aspiring accountant I was hoping you could help me. I got a internship offer for KPMG in audit which is great, but I think its likely I would feel more comfortable going into Advisory, probably Transactions and Restructuring branch of the Firm. Obviously I have to stick it out in audit for the internship, but is it possible to switch between service lines after, and probably location too?

I know that in the KPMG selection process I still need to go through the Partner Interview, so would you say I am potentially blowing my chances if I switch from Audit to Advisory, or should I play it safe, stick it out with Audit, and the ACA, and then transfer, assuming I passed and survived?

Thank you!

Dear Flip the Switch,

In the words of another, “Well, if I hear you correctly–and I think that I do–my advice to you is to finish your meal, pay your check, leave here, and never mention this to anyone again.”

Now maybe things are a little different in the UK but what you’re proposing is almost impossible to pull off and I’m not sure how you got in this situation in the first place. If the revelation that you’re more interested in advisory just came to you recently, that’s one thing. Your desire to pull a switch may be understandable but that doesn’t make it any more feasible. If, on the other hand, you accepted an audit internship with the knowledge that in reality you wanted an advisory internship, why didn’t you apply for an advisory internship?

On top of that you are also wanting to inquire about a moving to another office before you start full time? Let me see if I understand this correctly: you took an internship in a service area where you have no interest, in a location where you don’t want to live. Do you see why I’m confused? I’m not suggesting that you can’t ask but expect some side-eyed looks after you broach the subject. In other words, you could be “blowing your chances” because you sound like a person who doesn’t know what they want. These firms want people who are ready to hit the ground running, not someone who can’t seem to choose a path. If you can sit still for a year or three, then maybe you can start to inquire about a transfer of service line or location but as an intern-about-to-become-first-year, you’ll just sound like a lost puppy.

Phil Mickelson (and his KPMG Hat) Looks to Defend His Masters Title

As some of you know, the 2011 Masters kicks off today which means Phil Mickelson will attempt to defend his first KPMG major championship. PM is considered a slight favorite to win this year’s tournament (and to win a fourth sports jacket that closely resembles something that you could easily pick up at the Salvation Army).


It’s been a decent year since Phil won last year’s tournament as he landed his own KPMG website and was looking to upgrade to a new manse but apparently had to give up Five Guys.

Surprisingly that there hasn’t been an internal memo forwarded our way notifying everyone that certified Phil-KPMG caps could be worn for the next two days. Regardless, we’re sure that John Veihmeyer and Tim Flynn are holed up in the executive conference room at 345 Park, keeping tabs on Phil (he’s even after two) wearing their KPMG lids and passing chip n’ dips back and forth.

What Do Libya and KPMG Have in Common?

That was the question posed to us by our tipster. The answer: more and more defections. The latest is James Draper, per an internal email sent to us this morning.

Welcome new Risk Assurance Principal James Draper

The ranks of Risk Assurance continue to grow with the addition of accomplished professionals. These catalyst and experienced hires are helping us to evolve our services, and impress the marketplace with the expertise in which we deliver them. James Draper is our newest edition, joining us as a principle [sic, Jimbo is now a PwC “pal”] in our San Francisco office.

Jamie’s focus will be on helping to grow our IT&PA/ERP Controls services, particularly in the areas of SAP and JD Edwards. He joins us from KPMG where he has logged over 15 years experience assisting clients with technology risks. Instrumental in helping clients implement controls and security, Jamie has effectively managed the risks associated with large system implementations. In fact, he has assisted a number of global companies across a variety of industries through complex implementations, among them: Chevron, eBay, Nestle, Rolls-Royce (Aerospace) and Dolby. Jamie will help us to help our clients become more efficient in their control processes, leveraging system functionality including SAP’s Governance Risk & Compliance (GRC) module.

[The part where they talk about his personal life]

Please join me in welcoming Jamie to our firm, and to Risk Assurance.

If history is any indicator we’ll see a press release from PwC at some point but in the meantime, reactions to the latest KPMG turncoat are welcome at this time.

More competitive poaching:
PwC Lands Another KPMG Partner; Steven Tseng Joining Transfer Pricing Practice
PwC Picks Up Thomas Henry from KPMG; Will Lead Global Incentives Practice

In Case You Forgot, the Big 4 Are Hiring a Small Army of People This Year

CNN/Fortune managed to dig up this corpse of a story: “Bean counters wanted: Why the Big 4 are in a hiring frenzy.”  This refers to the hiring bonanza that Deloitte announced last September that was followed by various announcements by the rest of the Big 4:

[T]here’s one unlikely place where the help wanted sign is up, big time: Accounting firms.

Deloitte plans to hire 17,000 professionals in the U.S. and India in 2011, according to Cathleen Benko, its chief talent officer. It’s seeking accountants, auditors, consultants, and IT staff. Hiring is split evenly between experienced and entry-level applicants.

Ernst & Young has stepped up recruiting. It’s looking to hire 7,000 employees from college campuses — 4,500 full-time and 2,500 interns — and 6,000 experienced staff, totaling 13,000 people in 2011, says Dan Black, its director of Americas Campus Recruiting. Experienced staffing is up 80% from last year and campus recruits are up 20%.

Both firms compete for talent against PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and large consulting firms such as McKinsey and Bain. The hiring confirms a 2011 Bureau of Labor Statistics report that predicted employment in accounting and auditing would spike 22%.

For starters I don’t know why accounting firms are an “unlikely” place for the “help wanted sign” but don’t forget that this is the same outlet that told us that the firms were making money hand over fist back in the Fall of ’09. Also, why CNN/Fortune is now reporting Deloitte’s India’s hiring numbers as part of this story is a little confusing. Plus, if “hiring is split” between experienced and new hires that is a change in the breakdown from what was reported last September. Again, maybe the India numbers change things up a bit and I lost my 10-key long ago.

And we’ll also mention that the E&Y numbers are slightly better than what they initially reported last September so make of all these stats what you will, the rainbow and unicorn PR machine is in full force and CNN is happy to scoop them up spit them out.

Bean counters wanted: Why the Big 4 are in a hiring frenzy [CNNMoney]

(UDPATE) KPMG-Bermuda’s PCAOB Inspection Gets a Little Unwanted Attention

Most of you are acutely aware that PCAOB inspection reports, while chock full of interesting tidbits, are a little anti-climactic since we never learn who the auditees are. Oh sure, we can speculate until our heart’s content but the PCAOB says they took a vow of silence after 43 struck his signature on Sarbanes-Oxley.

The secrecy is frustrating (read: bor-ing) so it was especially cool to see Jonathan Weil let the cat out of the bag on at least one Big 4 client:

Two weeks ago,Accounting Oversight Board released its triennial inspection report on the Hamilton, Bermuda-based affiliate of KPMG, the Big Four accounting firm. And it was an ugly one. In one of the audits performed by KPMG- Bermuda, the board said its inspection staff had identified an audit deficiency so significant that it appeared “the firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s financial statements.”

This being the hopelessly timid PCAOB, however, the report didn’t say whose audit KPMG-Bermuda had blown. That’s because the agency, as a matter of policy, refuses to name companies where its inspectors have found botched audits. It just goes to show that the PCAOB’s first priority isn’t “to protect the interests of investors,” as the board’s motto goes. Rather, it is to protect the dirty little secrets of the accounting firms and their corporate audit clients.

That’s why it gives me great pleasure to be able to break the following bit of news: The unnamed company cited in KPMG- Bermuda’s inspection report was Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd. (ALTE), a Hamilton-based insurance company with a $2.3 billion stock- market value, which used to be known as Max Capital Group Ltd.

Using his detective skills, Weil pieced together the number clients KPMG Bermuda had inspected, the timing of said inspections and the details of the audit deficiency (“the failure to perform sufficient procedures to test the estimated fair value of certain available-for-sale securities”) to come up with Alterra. Of course no one – the PCAOB, KPMG Bermuda or Alterra – would comment/confirm for Weil’s column but you probably knew that was coming. Nevertheless, JW gets into the how bad of an audit this really was:

It’s when you look at Alterra’s financial statements that the magnitude of KPMG-Bermuda’s screw-up becomes apparent. Available-for-sale securities are the single biggest line item on Alterra’s balance sheet. They represented almost half of the company’s $7.3 billion of total assets as of Dec. 31, 2008, and a little more than half of its $9.9 billion of total assets at the end of last year.

This sort of screw-up, some might argue, falls somewhere in the range of “horrendously bad” and “really fucking bad” and Weil wonders if Alterra shareholders will have the stones to throw the bums out at the shareholders meeting on May 2. We can’t say where any of the shareholders stand on the usefulness (or lack thereof) of the audit report, so maybe this revelation is NBD to them. But if that is the case, it seems to make an even stronger case for the irrelevancy of auditors.

Weil’s larger point is that the PCAOB continues to hide behind their policies that are supposed to protect investors but in reality come off as talking points, not so unlike the firms they regulate. The PCAOB says they’re working on that but we’ll have to wait until summer to find out how crazy things get and whether it will be enough to shove auditors back into some respectability.

Dirty Little Secret Outed in Bermuda Blunder [Jonathan Weil/Bloomberg]

UPDATE:
Alterra cops to it with an 8-K that was filed about 90 minutes ago:

Alterra is aware of a recently issued report by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) related to the PCAOB’s review of KPMG Bermuda’s 2008 audit files of a public company client located Bermuda, as well as an article posted on Bloomberg that indicates that the public company client is Alterra (formerly Max Capital Group Ltd.). Alterra confirms that it is the client referenced in the PCAOB’s report.

The PCAOB report findings question the sufficiency of procedures performed by KPMG Bermuda in its audit of Alterra’s estimated fair value of certain available-for-sale securities as promulgated by generally accepted audit standards (“GAAS”). The PCAOB report questioned whether the audit procedures used by KPMG Bermuda in 2008 to verify such values were sufficient. The PCAOB report does not question the appropriateness of the values that Alterra attributed to assets available-for-sale in 2008.

Alterra notes that the PCAOB made substantially similar findings in a number of inspections of 2008 and 2009 audits performed by the larger accounting firms and, since 2008, we understand the firms have issued additional guidance to clarify the work to be completed on the audit of fair value investments.

KPMG Bermuda has represented to Alterra and its Audit Committee that it believes it properly and appropriately followed GAAS as defined at the time of the audit. KPMG Bermuda confirmed in its response to the PCAOB report that “none of the matters identified by the PCAOB required the reissuance of any of our previously issued reports.” Alterra reaffirms its belief that the asset values ascribed to its available-for-sale securities in 2008 and subsequent periods remain appropriate.

KPMG Bermuda issued an unqualified opinion for Alterra’s year end financial statements for each of 2008, 2009 and 2010.

BDO Is Not Impressed with KPMG’s Business Tactics in Brazil

BDO announced a new member firm in Brazil today because…well, KPMG kindasorta poached their last one. Well, BDO Global CEO Jeremy Newman has had it up to here (i.e. eye-level) and wanted to point out that A) this not uncommon:

“BDO is not the first firm to have suffered as a result of our larger competitors using their dominant financial position to buy market share and we have expressed our concerns about this in BDO’s recent submission to the European Commission’s Green Paper on the role of the audit profession,” said Newman.

B) this is some shady dealings:

“These tactics are not driven by client needs but by one firm’s wish to buy market share and presumably achieve further economies of scale. We are concerned that when one firm looks to dominate it reduces choice for clients and leaves the market worryingly dependent on just a few players.

and C) these aren’t just fightin’ words. The most interesting accounting firm in the world will be taking action:

“BDO will be lodging an objection to this deal with the Brazilian competition authorities.”

Challenge extended.

BDO lines up complaint against KPMG Brazil [Accountancy Age]

Did KPMG Really Warn HSBC About Madoff Fraud Risks?

A report in Bloomberg apparently thinks so.

From the ‘Berg:

HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA), Europe’s biggest lender, was warned twice by auditors that entrusting as much as $8 billion in client funds to Bernard Madoff opened it up to “fraud and operational risks.”

KPMG LLP told the London-based bank about the risks in 2006 and 2008 reports. The firm was hired to review how Madoff invested and accounted for the funds, for which HSBC served as custodian. KPMG reported 25 such risks in 2006, and in 2008 found 28, according to copies of the reports obtained by Bloomberg News.

Okay l there for two before everyone gets too excited. Let’s just get one thing straight right off the bat – KPMG probably leaked these reports to Bloomberg (I only say probably because I don’t know for an absolute fact but – COME ON – who else?). Secondly, even though the report says “warned twice by auditors” this was not an audit performed by KPMG; it was “[a] review how Madoff invested and accounted for the funds.” What exactly that entails isn’t clear; possibly agreed-upon procedures? Anyway, here’s what the story says were in the two reports:

In the list of risks in KPMG’s report, number 2 was that “BLM embezzles client funds,” using the initials as shorthand for Bernard L. Madoff. To prevent it, KPMG recommended in both 2006 and 2008 that HSBC “establish a process to monitor monthly statements” and reconcile them with contributions from clients.

[…]

The 2006 report listed fraud risk number 5 as “client cash is diverted for personal gain” and risk number 18 as “trade is a sham in order to divert client cash.” It went on to say there were concerns “Madoff LLC falsely reports buy/sell trades without actually executing in order to earn commissions” and “BLM falsifies accounting records which are provided to HSBC.”

KPMG reviewed samples of trades and account statements for both its 2006 and 2008 reports to test the risks and detected no discrepancies, the reports said. Even so, the firm suggested HSBC “consider undertaking a periodic review which includes tracing a sample of client trades back to the bulk order.”

After reading that you might think that KPMG hit a home run but what if the “risk factors” listed are just standard boilerplate risks that are included in every single one of these reports? If that’s the case, then KPMG was slapping in the applicable information as it related to BLM, handed it over and collected a nice fee. Maybe KPMG was all over this but there’s no way to know because A) Bloomberg didn’t republish the reports in full; B) Other KPMG teams close to Madoff are getting their asses sued which means they either ignored the risks or couldn’t get a hold of these two reports and C) HSBC throws KPMG under the bus, essentially saying that they were duped by Berns:

HSBC confirmed hiring KPMG in 2005 and 2008 to review Madoff’s firm, adding it now believed Madoff had tricked the auditors. “It appears from U.S. government filings that Madoff and his employees foiled these reviews by, among other things, providing forged documentation to KPMG,” the bank said in an e- mailed statement.

“KPMG did not conclude in either of its reports that a fraud was being committed by Madoff,” HSBC said. “HSBC did not know that a fraud was being committed and lost $1 billion of its own assets as a victim.”

So did KPMG warn HSBC or not? This Bloomberg story seems to think so but there are is a lot of evidence that KPMG was just as clueless as as everyone else who didn’t walk – or run away screaming, arms flailing – away from Madoff.

HSBC Was Told About Madoff ‘Fraud Risks’ in Two KPMG Reports [Bloomberg]

PwC Lands Another KPMG Partner; Steven Tseng Joining Transfer Pricing Practice

This just in – more competitive poaching from P. Dubs.

PwC US announced today that Steven Tseng has joined PwC US as a partner in the firm’s Transfer Pricing practice. Tseng will relocate to China in June to focus on helping multinational companies with their transfer pricing planning in China and the Asia Pacific region. Tseng will also take the lead role for tax and transfer pricing planning for companies seeking to transform their value chain globally, in particular in Asia.

Tseng joins the firm from KPMG, where he was the Asia Pacific Regional leader for Global Transfer Pricing Services (GTPS) as well as the partner in charge of GTPS in China and Hong Kong. Prior to this role, Tseng was partner in charge of Financial Advisory Services for KPMG in Finland.

This latest pickup follows the firm snagging Tom Henry last month. Rumors have it that there will be more but the question is, who’s next? John Veihmeyer? Keep us updated if you hear anything.

Social Media Poses Enough of a Risk to Overstock.com That They Disclosed It in Their 10-K

It’s been quite some time since we picked up the Overstock beat but Gary Weiss picked up something in the company’s recently filed 10-K yesterday that makes us wonder if the company was shooting for irony or if they’ve given up on blaming the “shorts” turning instead to “social media,” which, similar to the anti-short campaign would allow them to encompass a number of villains without naming anyone directly.


From “Note 1A: Risk Factors” section of the company’s notes to the financial statements:

There has been a marked increase in use of social media platforms and similar devices, including weblogs (blogs), social media websites, and other forms of Internet-based communications which allow individuals access to a broad audience of consumers and other interested persons. Consumers value readily available information concerning retailers, manufacturers, and their goods and services and often act on such information without further investigation, authentication and without regard to its accuracy. The availability of information on social media platforms and devices is virtually immediate as is its impact. Social media platforms and devices immediately publish the content their subscribers and participants post, often without filters or checks on accuracy of the content posted. The opportunity for dissemination of information, including inaccurate information, is seemingly limitless and readily available. Information concerning the Company may be posted on such platforms and devices at any time. Information posted may be adverse to our interests, it may be inaccurate, and may harm our performance, prospects or business. The harm may be immediate without affording us an opportunity for redress or correction. Such platforms also could be used for dissemination of trade secret information, compromise of valuable company assets all of which could harm our business, prospects, financial condition and results of operations.

As Gary points out, this disclosure is especially rich since Patrick Byrne had a goon using Facebook to stalk critics like Gary, Sam Antar, Barry Ritholtz among others which of course was disseminated in various social media outlets. Newsflash to Overstock’s risk managers: when people are being pursued by creeps on the Internet, they complain about to EVERYONE THEY KNOW.

One could easily argue that Segway accidents at the office pose just as great of a risk to key employees – and thus a disclosable item – but perhaps that’s covered under their D&O policy? It still seems plausible that disclosure would still be warranted. Additionally, the risk of a good snowfall might cause some of Salt Lake City-based company’s employees to call in sick to enjoy the fresh pow could have resulted in a late filing which is certainly something the SEC would want to know. We know KPMG has a crack squad of auditors all over this engagement but it’s conceivable that they overlooked some other risks. If you’ve got ideas on what those might be, let us know below.

Mike Mayo Is of the Opinion That Citigroup ‘May Have Violated Sarbanes-Oxley’

Last week we heard from a number of people on the topic of Citigroup’s internal controls that while it didn’t sound like they were quite up to snuff, KPMG was somehow cool with it and Vikram Pandit signed his name to it, saying that everything was hunky dory.

Now along with bloggers and journalists, the scourge of Citigroup, CLSA analyst Mike Mayo, has decided to get into the act:

Citigroup may have violated Sarbanes-Oxley with its 2007 10-K submission, in our opinion. The new information relates to letters from regulators that were only revealed earlier this year as part of the FCIC archive. We believe these letters between Citi and the Fed, Citi and the OCC, and the OCC with internal staff, imply that Citi should have known about internal control shortfalls for the year 2007 and was directly told about them by the OCC only eight days before the 10-K was signed. Also, Citi reported large unexpected losses with less than two months left in the year. Thus, the lingering question in our mind is why Citi signed off on its 2007 10-K as having effective controls in light of such problems. This information is still relevant today because it reflects on the magnitude of the risk shortfalls and what we feel is the higher-than-perceived task of turning them around.

That’s from Mayo’s update on the bank, dated today, and along with the “opinion” on a Sarbanes-Oxley violation, he has a few questions:

To what extent was the audit committee and board at Citi aware of the concerns voiced by various regulators at the time, and who gave the advice to sign the 10-K? To what extent has Citi’s board examined the issue since the release of letters from the FCIC? Has the SEC and DOJ looked into this matter?

We bolded that portion since it might – just might – be referring to KPMG and the apparent disregard everyone had for the letter sent to Citigroup from the OCC. Of course, not everyone always agrees with Mayo, namely Dick Bové who has gave HofK the thumbs up although it was obvious that he’d never heard of the firm. Bové hasn’t weighed in on this particular report but it’s only Monday.

Anyway, Citigroup remains steadfast in their thoughts on the matter, telling The Street’s Lauren Tara LaCapra that the “certifications were entirely appropriate,” although things increasingly seem to be pointing to the possibility that wasn’t the case. A message left for Marianne Carlton, a KPMG spokeswoman, hasn’t been returned.

A Few People Are Not Satisfied with the $624 Million Countrywide Settlement

And, unfortunately for Bank of America and KPMG, that could mean digging through the couch cushions.

Several large institutional investors have rejected a court settlement where Countrywide Financial Corp. had agreed to pay $600 million to a number of national pension funds. Those pulling out of the agreement include BlackRock Inc.; the California Public Employees Retirement System, or Calpers; T. Rowe Price Group Inc.; Nuveen Investments Inc.; and the Maryland State Retirement and Pension System, according to a document from the suit filed in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles. The investors decided the settlement, initially agreed to last May, wasn’t enough and will seek their own terms with the mortgage originator and its current owner Bank of America Corp., as well as Countrywide’s auditor KPMG LLP. KPMG had committed another $24 million to the settlement.

In typical HofK fashion, the firm didn’t bother commenting for the Journal’s story however BofA managed to express their disappointment, “It is unfortunate that some investors chose to opt out of what we believe is a fair and equitable agreement to settle these issues.” Right. Because the likes of BlackRock and Calpers should be tickled pink with the pleasure of splitting $624 million with dozens of other investors.

Big Investors Refuse Countrywide Settlement [WSJ]

How Did Citigroup’s Internal Controls Cut the Mustard with KPMG?

Jonathan Weil writes in his column today about Citigroup and their “acceptable group of auditors,” (aka KPMG) and he’s having trouble connecting the dots on a few things. Specifically, how a love letter (it was sent on February 14, 2008, after all) sent by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit:

The gist of the regulator’s findings: Citigroup’s internal controls were a mess. So were its valuation methogage bonds, which had spawned record losses at the bank. Among other things, “weaknesses were noted with model documentation, validation and control group oversight,” the letter said. The main valuation model Citigroup was using “is not in a controlled environment.” In other words, the model wasn’t reliable.

Okay, so the bank’s internal controls weren’t worth the paper they were printed on. Ordinarily, one could reasonably expect management and perhaps their auditors to be aware of such a fact and that they were handling the situation accordingly. We said, “ordinarily”:

Eight days later, on Feb. 22, Citigroup filed its annual report to shareholders, in which it said “management believes that, as of Dec. 31, 2007, the company’s internal control over financial reporting is effective.” Pandit certified the report personally, including the part about Citigroup’s internal controls. So did Citigroup’s chief financial officer at the time, Gary Crittenden.

The annual report also included a Feb. 22 letter from KPMG LLP, Citigroup’s outside auditor, vouching for the effectiveness of the company’s financial-reporting controls. Nowhere did Citigroup or KPMG mention any of the problems cited by the OCC. KPMG, which earned $88.1 million in fees from Citigroup for 2007, should have been aware of them, too. The lead partner on KPMG’s Citigroup audit, William O’Mara, was listed on the “cc” line of the OCC’s Feb. 14 letter.

Huh. There has to be an explanation, right? It’s just one of the largest banks on Earth audited by one of the largest audit firm on Earth. You’d think these guys would be more than willing to stand by their work. Funny thing – no one felt compelled to return JW’s calls. So, he had no choice to piece it together himself:

[S]omehow KPMG and Citigroup’s management decided they didn’t need to mention any of those weaknesses or deficiencies. Maybe in their minds it was all just a difference of opinion. Whatever their rationale, nine months later Citigroup had taken a $45 billion taxpayer bailout, [Ed. note: OH, right. That.] still sporting a balance sheet that made it seem healthy.

Actually, just kidding, he ran it by an expert:

“As I look at the deficiencies cited in the letter, taken as a whole, it appears that Citigroup had a material weakness with respect to valuing these financial instruments,” said Ed Ketz, an accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, who reviewed the OCC’s letter to Pandit at my request. “It just is overwhelming by the time you get to the end of it.”

What Vikram Pandit Knew, and When He Knew It [Jonathan Weil/Bloomberg]